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1 Introduction
Understanding the structures and functions of the rich internal landscape of cities has been
a formidable task that has attracted many economists (see surveys by, e.g., Anas, Arnott and
Small, 1998; Duranton and Puga, 2015). The most simplified model for describing the internal
structure of an urban region is to suppose, in the first place, that there exists a central business
district, toward which all workers in the city are assumed to commute. Then, the internal
structure of the city, in terms of the residential density of households, is determined by the
trade-oﬀ between commuting cost and land rent. This model—the monocentric city model
developed by Alonso (1964); Muth (1969); Mills (1967)—has been the workhorse of economic
analysis of urban land use. In the monocentric city model, urban spatial structure is supposed
to be formed by disincentives for the concentration of agents, or dispersion forces; households
in the framework are trying to reduce both the land rent paid and the commuting costs that they
must bear.
Another strand of research was initiated by the seminal work of Beckmann (1976), empha-
sizing the role of nonmarket interactions, or agglomeration economies, in the formation of urban
spatial structures. In this literature, the center of a city is no longer given a priori. The forma-
tion of a single major concentration in an urban area is described as the equilibrium outcome
under the presence of distance-decaying positive externalities: agents are supposed to prefer
proximity to other agents. In these models, the role of commuting costs is abstracted away. The
spatial structure of a city is delineated by the balance of the two opposing forces: a dispersion
force induced by land rent and an agglomeration force arising from positive externalities that
stem from the spatial concentration of agents.
The innovation of Fujita and Ogawa (1982) was to integrate the two strands of urban
models by considering the three mechanisms discussed above: the agglomerative force from
positive externalities between agents, the dispersion force induced by the commuting costs of
households, and land rent. As the first model that is capable of explaining the formation of
polycentric urban spatial structure as an equilibrium outcome, the contribution of Fujita and
Ogawa (1982) (henceforth FO) has been substantial.1
Despite anumberof simplifyingassumptions, theFOmodel is known for its intractability. In
particular, prevented by the lack of eﬀectivemethods for stability analysis, the stability of spatial
equilibria has not been addressed even after nearly forty years since it was originally proposed.
Because of the existence of agglomeration economies, the multiplicity of equilibria is inherent
in the FO model; the numerical analyses conducted by FO illustrated that numerous possible
equilibrium spatial configurations may coexist. Because some of the equilibria may never
be attained under any behaviorally natural assumptions pertaining to dynamics, equilibrium
refinement is crucial for drawing reliable implications. Given the huge influence of the FO
model, the absence of investigations into stability is becoming increasingly uncomfortable.
To address this issue, we introduce global stability analysis into the FO model. It is made
1Most notably, the seminal ideas suggested in the FO model have been introduced in the state-of-the-art quan-
titative spatial economic literature, including the works by Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm and Wolf (2015) and Owens,
Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte (2017) (see the survey by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017).
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possible by the fact, shown in this paper, that the FO model is a potential game, or a game
associated with scalar-valued functions that characterize its incentive structure (Monderer and
Shapley, 1996; Sandholm, 2001).
In potential games, sensible approaches are available for the characterization and selection
of equilibria. First, the set of Nash equilibria of a potential game coincides with that of Karush–
Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) points of the maximization problem of the associated potential function.
Second, the local maximizers of the potential function are locally stable under various myopic
learning dynamics including the best response dynamic (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991) and other
behaviorally plausible dynamics. Third, the global maximizer(s) of the potential function is
(are) globally stable in the sense of stochastic stability under the Logit choice rule (Blume, 1993)
or, alternatively, in the sense of selection under perfect foresight dynamics (Oyama, 2009a,b).
In this paper, we employ the last selection result. By selecting spatial configurations that
globally maximize the potential function, one can obtain globally stable equilibria in the FO
model. To concretely demonstrate the utility of our approach, we study the properties of
spatial equilibria in a specific, stylized economy, namely, one-dimensional circular geography.
We find that (i) the formation of a (single or multiple) business center can be a globally stable
equilibrium outcome; that (ii) the formation of business center(s) can be globally stable only
when the commuting costs of households are suﬃciently low; and that (iii) the business centers
in globally stable equilibria monotonically decrease in number, while their size increases,
whenever either the commuting costs of households goes lower monotonically or the level of
agglomeration externalities between firms diminishesmonotonically. The results are consistent
with intuition as well as conjectural predictions in the prior literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our contribution to the extant
literature. Section 3 formulates the model. Section 4 introduces a decomposition of the FO
model into the short- and long-run equilibrium problem. Sections 5 to 7 are devoted to the
study of a specific geography, i.e., circular geography as found in Mossay and Picard (2011),
to illustrate the eﬀectiveness of the potential game approach in the analysis of the FO model.
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
Through a series of papers Ogawa and Fujita (1980) and Fujita and Ogawa (1982), Masahisa
Fujita and Hideaki Ogawa initiated the study of urban spatial equilibrium models with mul-
tiple types of agents and economics of agglomeration.2 The framework has been extended in
many directions, including two-dimensional space (Ogawa and Fujita, 1989); a monopolistic
competition framework (Fujita, 1988); multi-unit firms (Ota and Fujita, 1993); and full-fledged
general equilibrium frameworks (Lucas, 2001; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002; Berliant, Peng
and Wang, 2002; Mossay, Picard and Tabuchi, 2017). The latest generation of quantitative
spatial economic models (e.g., Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Owens et al., 2017), implicitly or explic-
itly, inherit many elements from these theories. These studies have significantly contributed
2The study of socially optimal urban spatial structure under similar assumptions had been explored by other
researchers, e.g., Imai (1982).
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toward enhancing the reduced-form insights suggested by FO. However, their exploration of
the properties of spatial equilibria for their models has been inadequate because of the lack of
systematic analytical methods. In particular, investigations into stability are virtually absent.
As we discussed, equilibrium selection is vital to the drawing of robust insights in the face of
the possibility of multiple equilibria. This paper is the first step in tackling the stability issue
of equilibria in FO-type frameworks. Section 8 briefly discusses that the potential game ap-
proach employed in the present paper is eﬃcacious in the analyis of models with more general
assumptions than the original FO model.
For concrete analyses conducted in Sections 5 to 7, we employ circular geography, which
is one of the canonical set-ups for theoretical investigation (e.g., Papageorgiou and Smith,
1983; Krugman, 1993; Mossay and Picard, 2011; Akamatsu, Takayama and Ikeda, 2012; Ikeda,
Akamatsu and Kono, 2012; Blanchet, Mossay and Santambrogio, 2016; Osawa, Akamatsu and
Takayama, 2017) as it abstracts away various eﬀects of geographical asymmetries. In what
related to our results,Mossay andPicard (2011) andBlanchet et al. (2016) analyzed amodelwith
a single type of mobile agents (Beckmann-type model), in contrast to the FO model where there
are two types of mobile agents. They showed that the formation of symmetric disjointed cities
that are equidistantly placed on the circumference is the only possible equilibrium outcome.
In our context, the multiple-city equilibrium may be interpreted as the formation of multiple
business centers in a city. Highlighted in the study is the intrinsicmultiplicity of equilibria—not
only rotationally symmetric spatial configurations over a circle but also equilibria that diﬀer in
the number of cities can coexist. With regard to this, equilibrium selection is essential. The
stability of multiple-city equilibria is, however, unknown.3
We formulate a discrete-space version of the FOmodel where the city is divided into a finite
number of cells to avoid technical complications. In Section 7, however, we turn our attention to
the continuous limit where the number of cells approaches infinity to approximate the original
continuous-space formulation. The analysis in the section relates to nonatomic games with
continuous strategy sets and a continuum of agents. This class of games, along with associated
learning dynamics, was recently proposed by Cheung and Lahkar (2018). It would be possible
to directly analyze the continuous-space model as an instance of this class of games.4 However,
the characterization of the global stability of equilibria for this class of games is absent in the
literature. In addition, the FO model incorporates the solving of an optimal transport problem
(Santambrogio, 2015) as a lower-level problem (see Section 7) which may introduce another
source of technical complications. We, therefore, resort to the “continuous approximation of a
finite-strategy game” interpretation to focus onmore general insights. Further developments in
the theory of learning dynamics in games that have continuous strategy sets and a continuum
of agents are crucial to the study spatial economic models that typically suppose continuous
3Blanchet et al. (2016) characterizes spatial equilibria of Beckmann (1976)’s and other models as a variational
problem regarding a specific functional. The variational characterization would also be employed for the stability
analysis of the equilibria. In fact, Akamatsu, Fujishima and Takayama (2017) studies stability of equilibria for a
discrete-space version of Beckmann (1976)’s model employing a variational formulation.
4A rigorous analysis of continuous-space model has been presented by Carlier and Ekeland (2007). Although
their analysis is by far general in its assumptions compared to other studies, most of the analysis focuses on
qualitative analysis (existence and uniqueness).
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space.
Our approach toward equilibrium selection is, as discussed in Section 1, based on a global
stability analysis under existence of a potential function. In the context of network games
(Jackson, 2010), where the multiplicity of equilibria is pervasive, equilibrium selection that is
based on global stability concepts (most notably, the stochastic stability concept) is one of the
standard recipes for theoretical andnumerical investigations (see, e.g.,Wallace andYoung, 2015,
for a survey). The present paper provides an example for another range of applications, i.e.,
spatial equilibrium models with agglomeration economies, where the occurrence of multiple
equilibria is ubiquitous, so that equilibrium refinement that is based on global stability can
eﬀectively remediate the elucidation of the properties of the models. In particular, Section
6 illustrates that the FO model can in fact have multiple locally stable equilibria. Under such
circumstances, equilibrium selection based on global stability can make the discussion cleaner
without aﬀecting the basic implications of the model.
3 The model
Building on Fujita and Ogawa (1982), we introduce a discrete-space model of the internal
structure of cities. We then show that the set of equilibria of the model is characterized by an
optimization problem.
3.1 Setup
Consider a city that consists of a set of discrete cells indexed by i , j, . . . ∈ I ≡ {1, 2, . . . , I}.
Each cell i ∈ I is endowed with ai > 0 units of a fixed supply of land area where we suppose∑
i∈I ai  1. We denote a ≡ (ai)i∈I . Land is owned by absentee landlords who spend their
rental revenues outside the city. The opportunity cost of land is normalized to 0. We suppose
that there are two types of mobile agents: households and firms.
Households freely migrate from the outside world where their reservation utility is nor-
malized to be 0. The total mass of households in the city is denoted by N . Each household
is endowed with a single unit of labor that is supplied to firms and compensated by a wage.
Each household inelastically consumes one unit of land for household purposes. Supposing
quasilinear utility, the indirect utility of a household located in cell i and commuting to j is
given by the following:
vi j  w j − ti j − ri , (1)
where w j ≥ 0 and ri ≥ 0 are endogenously determined market wages prevailing in cell j and
the prevailing land rent in cell i, respectively, and ti j ≥ 0 is the commuting cost from i to j in the
monetary unit. We denote w ≡ (wi)i∈I ∈ RI+, r ≡ (ri)i∈I ∈ RI+, and r ≡ (ti j)i j∈I×I ∈ RI2+ . Also,
the mass of households that commute from cell i to j is denoted by ni j ≥ 0. The commuting
pattern as a whole is denoted by n ≡ (ni j)i j∈I×I ∈ RI2+ .
We assume that there is a fixed mass of M business firms. Each business firm produces a
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single unit of goods exported to the outside world under a fixed price prevailing there. Each
firm requires one unit of land and φ > 0 units of labor to operate. The profit of a firm located
in cell i in reduced form is given by
pii  Ai − φwi − ri , (2)
where Ai expresses the level of production in cell i.
Let mi ≥ 0 be the mass of firms in i ∈ I, andm ≡ (mi)i∈I denotes the spatial distribution of
firms. Then, as each firm uses a single unit of land in production, the set of all possible spatial
configurations of firms is given by the following:
∆ ≡
{
m ∈ RI+
 ∑
i∈I
mi  M, 0 ≤ mi ≤ ai ∀i ∈ I
}
. (3)
We suppose that there is an external economy in production that arises from nonmarket
interactions: firms are supposed to produce more goods when they are close to other firms.
Let di j be the strength of the spatial spillover of positive externalities from j to i. We assume
that Ai is expressed by the following:
Ai(m) 
∑
j∈I
di jm j . (4)
We impose the following assumptions on D  [di j] so that the above expression actually
expresses the positive externalities of agglomeration.
Assumption 1. D  [di j] satisfies the following conditions.
(i) D is symmetric: di j  d ji ∀i , j ∈ I.
(ii) D is positive definite with respect to T∆ ≡ {ϵ  (ϵi) ∈ RI | ∑i∈I ϵi  0}, i.e., ϵ⊤Dϵ > 0 for all
nonzero ϵ ∈ T∆.
For example, Assumption 1 is satisfied by a common specification in the spatial interaction
modeling literature di j  e−τℓi j where τ > 0 is a distance-decay parameter and ℓi j is the
geographical distance from i to j.5 The first condition (i) requires that the amount of spatial
spillover that a firm induces is symmetric for all pairs of i and j. It is satisfied by various
specifications of spatial spillover that define di j by monotonic transformations of ℓi j . The
second condition (ii) implies self-reinforcing externalities. Consider that a hypothetical firm
leaves a cell and joins another. Then, under Assumption 1 (ii), the improvements in the positive
externalities of the cell to which the firm switches dominate those found in one left.
3.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, every household shouldmaximize its own utility so that there is no incentive to
change its residential location or job location. Moreover, every firm should maximize its own
5For instance, Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) employs the exponential specification to express agglomeration economies.
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profit by choosing its location. These conditions are expressed as follows:
(utility maximization)
{
v∗  vi j  w j − ti j − ri if ni j > 0
v∗ ≥ vi j  w j − ti j − ri if ni j  0
∀i j ∈ I × I , (5)
(profit maximization)
{
pi∗  pii  Ai(m) − ri − φwi if mi > 0
pi∗ ≥ pii  Ai(m) − ri − φwi if mi  0
∀i ∈ I , (6)
where v∗  0 and pi∗ ≥ 0 are the reservation utility and equilibrium profit levels, respectively.
The land and labor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The markets clear when
the following conditions are met:
(land market clearing)

mi +
∑
j∈I
ni j  ai if ri > 0
mi +
∑
j∈I
ni j ≤ ai if ri  0
∀i ∈ I , (7)
(labor market clearing)

∑
i∈I
ni j  φm j if w j > 0∑
i∈I
ni j ≥ φm j if w j  0
∀ j ∈ I. (8)
Last, we must require
(conservation)
∑
i∈I
mi  M, (9)
as we assume that the total mass of firms in the city is fixed.
To summarize, equilibrium in the model is defined as follows:
Definition 1. For a given set of the exogenous parameters (D, t,a, φ), a spatial equilibrium is a
collection of variables (n,m, r,w, pi∗) satisfying the conditions (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9).
From (7) and (8) it must be noted that M + N ≤ 1 and N ≥ φM, implying that M ≤ 11+φ ∈
(0, 1). This condition arises because of the normalization of land endowment {ai}. Otherwise,
it should read
∑
i∈I ai ≥ N + M ≥ (1 + φ)M, which requires that the total land endowment
meet the total demand from all agents (firms and households) in a city in equilibrium; the area
of the city should increase with the mass of its residents. In addition, in equilibrium, every
household in the city should supply its labor to some firm; letting N∗ be the total equilibrium
mass of households, we must have N∗  φM.
3.3 Associated optimization problem
It turns out that the set of spatial equilibria in the model is associated with an optimization
problem. Let f : RI → R and h : RI2 → R be defined as follows:
f (m) ≡
∮
A(ω)dω  12
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
di jmim j , (10)
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h(n) ≡
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
ti jni j . (11)
Given f and h, we have the following characterization of the spatial equilibria.6
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 (i). Then, any spatial equilibrium of the model is a KKT point
of the following optimization problem:
[P0] max(m,n)≥0 f (m) − h(n) (12a)
s.t. mi +
∑
j∈I
ni j ≤ ai [ri] ∀i ∈ I , (12b)∑
i∈I
ni j ≥ φm j [w j] ∀ j ∈ I , (12c)∑
i∈I
mi  M, [pi∗] (12d)
where ri , w j , and pi∗ are determined as the Lagrange multiplier for the land supply constraint (12b), the
labor supply constraint (12c), and the conservation constraint (12d), respectively.
Observe that the objective function of the optimization problem reflects the structure of the
model. On the one hand, the first term f (m) is a measure of firms’ merit from agglomeration.
We note that f (m) is strictly convex on ∆ under Assumption 1 (ii).
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 (ii). Then f (m) is strictly convex.
Therefore, the first term of the objective function (12a) always prefers agglomeration toward a
smaller number of cells, which is consistent with intuition.
On the other hand, h(n) is the total commuting cost that is spent in the city for a given n.
Thus, [P0] is a problem that pertains to maximizing the merit of agglomeration on the side of
firms, while at the same time reducing the commuting costs of households.
Remark 1. Although related, [P0] is not a welfare maximization problem. The welfare maxi-
mization problem for the model would be as follows:
[W] max
(m,n)≥0
2 f (m) − h(n) s.t. (12b), (12c), and (12d) (13)
because the surplus of agglomeration is given by
∑
i∈I Ai(m)mi  2 f (m). Since [W] has a
larger weight on f (m) than [P0] does and f (m) prefers agglomeration, the agglomeration of
firms is inadequate in equilibrium when compared with the social optimum.
4 Short- and long-run equilibria
To elucidate the structure of the problem [P0], we consider decomposing the original equi-
librium problem into an equivalent two-step problem by supposing that the adjustment of
6All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
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households’ decision is faster than that of firms. In the short run, the spatial distribution of
firmsm ∈ ∆ is fixed, with only households choosing their residential location and workplace.
In the long run, firms choose locations thatmaximize their profit, while respecting the short-run
equilibrium.
4.1 Short-run equilibrium
Givenm ∈ ∆, the short-run equilibrium considers households’ decisions pertaning to optimal
job and residential location choice.
Definition 2 (Short-run equilibrium). Fix a given set of parameters (t,a, φ) and a spatial
distribution of firmsm ∈ ∆. Then, a short-run equilibrium is a collection of variables (n, rˇ, wˇ)
satisfying conditions (5), (7), and (8), where we replace (r,w)with (rˇ, wˇ).
In Definition 2, we replace r andw with rˇ  (rˇi) and wˇ  (wˇi), respectively, to indicate that
they are short-run equilibrium variables. We note that rˇ and wˇ do not necessarily coincide
with long-run equilibrium values of land rent and wages because firms’ strategies are fixed in
the short run.
The short-run equilibrium reduces to an optimization problem.
Proposition 2. The short-run equilibrium for a givenm ∈ ∆ has the following properties:
(a) Any short-run equilibrium commuting pattern n is a KKT point for the following problem:
[S] min
n≥0 h(n) s.t. (12b) and (12c). (14)
(b) Any short-run equilibrium value of (rˇ, wˇ) is the KKT point for the following problem:
[D] max
(rˇ,wˇ)≥0
h∗(rˇ, wˇ) ≡ φ
∑
i∈I
wˇimi −
∑
i∈I
rˇi (ai − mi) , (15a)
s.t. 0 ≥ wˇ j − ti j − rˇi ∀i , j ∈ I , (15b)
where we normalize rˇ and wˇ by lettingmini∈I{rˇi}  0.
Observe that [S] is theminimization of total commuting costs across the citywhile satisfying
the land and labor market constraints. [D] is the dual problem for [S]. The first term of
its objective is the total land rent paid, and the second term is the total wages received by
households. Thus, [D] is the maximization of the surplus of households, while keeping utility
of households below the reservation utility level 0. It determines the highest bid rˇ for land and
lowest possible wage wˇ to compensate for commuting costs and land rent.
With [S] being a linear programming problem, nmight not be uniquely determined. How-
ever, the optimal value uniquely exists because (12b), (12c), and the nonnegativity constraint of
n together define a closed and convex set. We can therefore regard it as a function ofm. Let
hˇ(m) be the optimal value of [S] as a function ofm. Then, it coincides with the optimal value
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of [D] because of the strong duality of linear programming:
hˇ(m) ≡ min
n
h(n)  max
rˇ,wˇ
h∗(rˇ, wˇ).
From the dual representation [D], hˇ(m) is a point-wise maximum of the aﬃne functions ofm;
thus, it is convex inm.
Corollary 1. hˇ(m) is convex.
Intuitively, the convexity of hˇ(m)means that if firms are concentrated in a smaller number
of cells, it induces a larger total commuting costs of households in short-run equilibrium.
It is noted that the envelope theorem implies the following relation:
∂hˇ(m)
∂mi
 φwˇi(m) + rˇi(m). (16)
The right-hand side coincides with the firms’ (minimized) short-run costs. The profit of firms
in cell i in the short-run equilibrium is given by the following:
pˇii(m) ≡ Ai(m) − φwˇi(m) − rˇi(m). (17)
4.2 Long-run equilibrium
Given the short-run equilibrium land rent rˇ(m) and wage wˇ(m), the profit-maximization
condition for firms (6) may be rewritten as follows:{
pi∗  pii  Ai(m) − φwˇi(m) − rˇi(m) − rˆi if mi > 0
pi∗ ≥ pii  Ai(m) − φwˇi(m) − rˇi(m) − rˆi if mi  0
∀i ∈ I , (18)
where rˆi ≥ 0 is the additional land rent paid by firms in the long run. The market land rent
ri of the whole problem (7) is, thus, decomposed as ri  rˆi + rˇi . With regard to rˆ  (rˆi), the
following condition should be met:
(land market clearing in the long-run)
{
mi  ai if rˆi > 0
mi ≤ ai if rˆi  0
∀i ∈ I. (19)
It requires that if households cannot aﬀord to reside in cell i, (i.e., if rˆi > 0 so that ri  rˇi+ rˆi > rˇi),
the cell is completely occupiedby thefirms in the long run. Similarly, ifmi ≤ ai and∑ j∈I ni j ≥ 0,
the land rent paid by firms and households must be the same: rˆi  0 so that ri  rˇi .
Summing up, the long-run equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Long-run equilibrium). Fix a given set of parameters (D, t,a, φ). A long-run
equilibrium is a collection of variables (m, rˆ, pi∗) satisfying (18), (19), and (9), where the asso-
ciated short-run equilibrium is defined for the parameters (t,a, φ).
Long-run equilibria are characterized by an optimization problem.
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Proposition 3. Let g(m) ≡ f (m)− hˇ(m). Any long-run equilibrium spatial distributionm is a KKT
point for the following maximization problem:
[P] max
m∈∆
g(m). (20)
It is easy to show that any long-run equilibrium spatial distribution of firms, given its asso-
ciated short-run equilibrium, is an equilibrium solution for the original problem (Definition 1).
In fact, the decomposition of the short- and long-run problems is basically entailed in the
following rearrangement:
[P0]  max(m,n)≥0
{
f (m) − h(n)  s.t. (12b), (12c), (12d)}
 max
m∈∆
{
f (m) −min
n≥0 {h(n) | s.t. (12b), (12c)}
}
 max
m∈∆
{
f (m) − hˇ(m)}
 [P],
where the second equality is justified by the fact that the lower-level problem is a simple linear
programming problem.
Although equivalent, the property of the problem [P] is simpler to interpret and analyze
than that of [P0]. For instance, in [P], the objective function g(m) is nonconvex because it
is the diﬀerence of convex functions; it clearly indicates the possible multiplicity of long-run
equilibria without the need of deriving any concrete examples.
4.3 Stability of long-run equilibria
Proposition 3 shows that the long-run equilibrium problem (Definition 3) is a potential game
in the following definition.
Definition 4 (Nonatomic potential game). A nonatomic game is a triplet G  (S ,X ,F ) of a finite
strategy setS  {1, 2, . . . , S}where S denotes the number of strategies; closed and convex state
space X ⊂ RS+; and payoﬀ function F : X → RS. A nonatomic game G is a potential game if
there exists a scalar-valued function p : X → R such that the following holds true:
∂p(x)
∂xi
− ∂p(x)
∂x j
 Fi(x) − F j(x) ∀i , j ∈ S , ∀x ∈ X. (21)
Corollary 2. The long-run equilibrium problem is a potential game with strategy set I, state space ∆,
payoﬀ function pˇi : ∆→ RI , and the associated potential function g : ∆→ R.
Note that the payoﬀ function for firms is the short-run profit defined by (17). The short-run
profit function satisfies (21) because upon recalling the relation (16), we have the following:
∂g(m)
∂mi
 Ai(m) − φwˇi(m) − rˇi(m)  pˇii(m). (22)
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For the interior of ∆, we have rˆ  0, and thus, pi(m)  pˇi(m); therefore (21) holds true for the
long-run profit function pi(m) as well. At a long-run equilibrium where mi  ai for some cells,
rˆi is determined so as to cancel out any firms’ extra profit and to ensure that the long-run payoﬀ
is given by some equal level pi∗ for all i with mi > 0,
rˆi  pˇii − pi∗ ∀i with mi > 0. (23)
Therefore, (21) does not hold true for firms’ long-run profits pii  pˇii + rˆi . This property
deviates from simple nonatomic potential games in the literature (Sandholm, 2001), where the
state space is merely the (S − 1)-simplex. The subtle diﬀerence does not matter as the long-run
equilibrium profit of firms is unambiguously determined by the condition (19).
It follows that one can employ the desirable properties of (nonatomic) potential games to
analyze the long-run equilibrium problem. The following theorem summarizes the relevant
facts in the literature (see, e.g., Sandholm, 2010, and the references therein).
Theorem 1 (Characterization of equilibria and their stability in nonatomic potential games).
Consider a nonatomic potential game G  (S ,X ,F ) with the potential function p : X → R. Let P
denote the associated potential maximization problem: maxx∈X p(x). The following results hold true
for G and P.
(1) The set of KKT points for P coincides with that of Nash equilibria of G, NE(G).
(2) The set of local maximizers for P coincides with that of locally stable equilibria of G under
deterministic myopic learning dynamics Ûm  V (m) which preserves the total mass of the agents
and satisfies Ûm · V (m) > 0 for allm < NE(G) and Ûm  0 for allm ∈ NE(G).
(3) The set of global maximizers for P coincides with that of globally stable equilibria of G in the sense
of stochastic stability under stochastic learning dynamics with the Logit choice rule.
As our aim is to neither propose novel behavioral dynamics nor new stability concepts, we
proceed by simply accepting the above facts in the literature. In the following, depending on
the context, the stability of equilibria indicates either local stability or global stability in the
sense summarized in Theorem 1. We tacitly suppose (i) deterministic learning dynamics that
satisfies conditions listed in Theorem 1 for local stability claims, and (ii) stochastic learning
dynamics with the Logit choice rule for global stability claims.
5 Geography
For the remainder of the paper, we focus on a specific stylized geography to elucidate the
intrinsic role of the model parameters.7 To circumvent issues arising from asymmetries im
particular, we suppose that the underlying geography is a symmetric circle (Figure 1) as in
Papageorgiou and Smith (1983) or Krugman (1993).
7Since the potential function g(m) for our model is neither concave nor convex, a complete study of the model
for general set-ups of the parameters (D, t,a, φ) is practically impossible. Yet, we also note that the optimization
formulation can be utilized to numerically tackle general cases; observe that Propositions 1, 2, and 3 do not impose
any restrictions onD nor t other than Assumption 1.
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Figure 1: A circular geography
Assumption 2 (Geography). The underlying geography is a one-dimensional circular network with
circumferential length 1 that is indexed as a unit interval [0, 1). In addition the following hold true:
(i) Each cell has the same length 1I and is equidistantly placed over the circle; the cell i ∈ I is centered
at xi  1I (i − 1) ∈ [0, 1). For all i, ai  a ≡ 1I so that
∑
i∈I ai  1.
(ii) di j  e−τℓi j and ti j  tℓi j with τ, t > 0, where ℓi j ≡ min
{|xi − x j |, 1 − |xi − x j |} is the
minimum geographical distance between xi and x j along the circle.
Assumption 2 abstracts away any cell-specific advantage arising from greater capacity
or proximity to other cells. Following Fujita and Ogawa (1982), we suppose that {di j} is
exponential and that {ti j} is linear in distance. The parameter τ determines how fast the
technological externalities decrease in distance, whereas t denotes the commuting cost rate per
unit of distance. Note that Assumption 2 (ii) is suﬃcient for Assumption 1.8
Imposing circular geography allows us to isolate the role of endogenous forces in the
determination of spatial patterns because it abstracts away the cell-specific advantages induced
by the shape of the underlying transportation network. For instance, in a line segment, the
locations near the city boundaries have fewer opportunities to access the other cells. By contrast,
in a circle, every cell has the same level of accessibility to the other cells under Assumption 2.
It follows that the uniform distribution of firms is always a long-run equilibrium under
Assumption 2. The uniform distribution m¯ is a spatial pattern where mi  m¯ ≡ MI , nii  φmi ,
and ni j  0 for all j , i. Following the tradition of the economics of agglomeration (Fujita,
Krugman and Venables, 1999), we study the spontaneous formation of spatial patterns from
ex-ante uniform and symmetric distribution of mobile agents. The uniform distribution of
agents is, however, never locally stable if the land endowment is larger than the equilibrium
mass of agents N∗ +M  (1 + φ)M.
Lemma 2. Suppose that (1 + φ)M < 1 and Assumption 2. Then, the uniform distribution of firms m¯
is a long-run equilibrium, but it is locally unstable.
Intuitively, if (1 + φ)M < 1 then excess land supply exists in every cell at the uniform
pattern. It implies that some firms can improve their profit by relocating (along with all of its
8For the linear commuting cost, equilibrium commuting pattern may not be unique (Berliant and Tabuchi, 2018).
The (minimized) total commuting costs is, however, uniquely given; it suﬃces for stability analysis of long-run
equilibria.
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employees) to another cell, implying some instability in m¯.
To allow for the possibility of the uniform pattern being stable, we assume that there is no
excess land supply in the city.
Assumption 3 (No excess land supply). (1 + φ)M  1.
Assumption 3 implies that M 
∑
i∈I mi  11+φ ∈ (0, 1) and N  φM  φ1+φ ∈ (0, 1). In the
following, we define ρ ≡ 11+φ so that M  ρ and N  1 − ρ; it is interpreted as the ratio of the
mass of firms to the total mass of mobile agents (firms and households).
6 Simple examples: The two-, three-, four- and eight-cell city
We first consider cities with a small number of cells (I  2, 3, 4 and 8) to illustrate the utility of
potential game approach and the basic workings of the model parameters, in particular, τ and
t. It is also observed in concrete terms that the potential function is nonconvex.
For the remainder of the paper, we impose Assumptions 2 and 3. For this case, there is a
set of useful predictions regarding the local stability of equilibria.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3. Then, the long-run equilibrium has the following properties.
(a) The uniform distribution is locally stable for all (τ, t).
(b) Any interior equilibrium other than the uniform distribution (if it exists) is locally unstable.
(c) No locally stable equilibrium involves more than one “unbalanced” mixed use cells, i.e., cells with
mi > 0,
∑
j∈I ni j > 0, and φmi ,
∑
j∈I ni j so that there is commuting from or toward the cell.
Observe that Lemma 3 allows one to focus on a specific subset of spatial distribution of
firms; mi ∈ {0, ρa , a} for all i ∈ I (except for, possibly, one cell) where we recall a  1I is the
uniform level of land endowment in each cell and m¯  MI  ρa. The fact greatly simplifies the
enumeration of spatial configurations that oﬀer the possibility of stability.
6.1 The two-cell city
Suppose I  2. We take m1 as the variable as m2  ρ − m1. To respect that 0 ≤ mi ≤ a and
m1 + m2  ρ, we must require that m1 ∈ [ρ − mˆ , mˆ] where mˆ  min{a , ρ}. Then, solving for
the short-run equilibrium, hˇ(m) and f (m) as functions of m1 are computed as follows:
hˇ(m1)  t2
m1 − m¯ρ  , (24)
f (m1)  (1 − d) (m1 − m¯)2 + (1 + d)m¯2 , (25)
where d ≡ e− τ2 ∈ (0, 1) is the extent of positive externalities from one cell to the other.
Figure 2 illustrates the graphs of the potential function g(m1) ≡ f (m1) − hˇ(m1) as well as
f (m1) and hˇ(m1) with (ρ, d)  ( 12 , 12 ) for three diﬀerent values of t, namely, high, medium,
and low. Observe that g is neither convex nor concave. Local and global maximizers of g
are indicated by gray and black markers, respectively, whereas white markers indicate local
14
(a) High t (t  3t∗) (b) Medium t (t  32 t
∗) (c) Low t (t  12 t
∗)
Figure 2: The graphs of g(m1)with (ρ, d)  ( 12 , 12 ) for diﬀerent values of t.
minimizers. For the high-commuting-cost case, the uniform distribution is the only local (and
global) maximizer. For the medium-commuting-cost case, there are three local maximizers
among which the uniform distribution is the global maximizer. For the low-commuting-cost
case, there are three localmaximizers, where agglomeration toward any one of the cells globally
maximize g.
Theorem 1 implies that the properties of the long-run equilibria are characterized by the
maximization problem maxm1 g(m1). Employing the analytic formula for g, we obtain the
following proposition and its corollary.
Proposition 4. Assume that I  2 andwithout loss of generality letm1 ≥ m¯, so thatm1 ∈ ∆′ ≡ [m¯ , mˆ].
The set of the KKT points K2, the local maximizer(s) L2, and the global maximizer(s) G2 of the potential
function g(m1) over ∆′ are given by the following:
K2 
{{m¯} if t > 2t∗
{m¯ , mˇ , mˆ} if 0 < t ≤ 2t∗ , L2 
{{m¯} if t > 2t∗
{m¯ , mˆ} if 0 < t ≤ 2t∗ ,G2 

{m¯} if t > t∗
{m¯ , mˆ} if t  t∗
{mˆ} if 0 < t < t∗
,
respectively, where mˇ ≡ m¯ + t4ρ(1−d) , t∗  ρ2(1− d) if 0 < ρ ≤ a and t∗  ρ(1− ρ)(1− d) if a < ρ < 1.
Corollary 3. K2, L2, and G2 are the set of all possible, locally stable, and globally stable long-run
equilibria, respectively, in the sense summarized in Theorem 1.
In Proposition 4,m1  m¯ is the uniformdistribution m¯  (m¯ , m¯), andm1  mˆ agglomeration
where one of the cell has a greater mass of firms: m  (mˆ , ρ − mˆ).
Proposition 4 states that theuniformdistribution m¯ is the onlypossible (locally andglobally)
stable equilibrium for larger values of t, whereas agglomeration becomes stable for smaller
values of t. In other words, for any level of d, m¯ should be the only equilibrium if the
commuting cost per distance t is suﬃciently high; the costs of commuting overcome the merit
of agglomeration. In particular, if t > t∗0 ≡ t∗ |d0, agglomeration is unstable. On the other
hand, provided that t < t∗0, agglomeration is stable (unstable) for smaller (larger) values of d
because t∗ is decreasing in d. If d is suﬃciently large, proximity to other firms matters less.
As Proposition 4 indicates, the (relative) mass of firms ρ does not aﬀect the qualitative
properties of equilibrium spatial patterns. To simplify the analysis, we tacitly suppose φ  1 for
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(a) Locally stable equilibria (b) Globally stable equilibria
Figure 3: Locally and globally stable equilibria t (I  2, ρ  12 ).
(a) f (m) (b) −hˇ(m)
Figure 4: Contours of f (m) and hˇ(m) for the three-cell city.
the remainder of this paper; this is also the same parameter setting that was used by Fujita and
Thisse (2013).
Assumption 4. ρ  12 , or equivalently, φ  1.
Figure 3a and Figure 3b show the bifurcation diagrams of locally and globally stable equi-
libria, respectively, in terms of m1 under Assumption 4 (i.e., m¯  14 and mˆ 
1
2 ). Observe that
agglomeration becomes locally (globally) stable for t < 2t∗ (t < t∗). We observe that glob-
ally stable equilibria are a subset of locally stable ones; thus Figure 3b may be regarded as a
“simplified version” of Figure 3a. Alternatively, if one does not have any a priori information
regarding locally stable equilibria, Figure 3b provides a suﬃcient information regarding the
eﬀects of changing parameter values. With this observation in mind, we focus on globally
stable equilibria for the remainder of this paper.
6.2 The three-cell city
We next study the landscape of the potential function g(m) for I  3 under Assumption 4.
Lemma3 implies that theuniformpattern (m¯ , m¯ , m¯) andagglomeration (a , ρ − a , 0)  (2m¯ , m¯ , 0)
can be stable in the three-cell case, where, without loss of generality, we let m1 ≥ m2 ≥ m3.
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(a) t  0.15 (b) t  0.05 (c) t  0.03
Figure 5: Contours of g(m) for the three-cell city (d  12 , ρ  12 ).
Figure 6: Contours of g(m)with equilibrium patterns (d  12 , t  0.05).
Although the simple formulas for f (m) and hˇ(m) are still available for concrete analysis,
we focus on graphical intuitions because the basic results are the same with I  2. Figure 4
shows the contours of f (m) and −hˇ(m) on ∆ by the simplex coordinate. In what is similar to
the two-cell case, f (m) and hˇ(m) are respectively a parabola and a piecewise aﬃne function,
attaining minimum at m¯.
Figure 5 shows the contours of g(m) for diﬀerent values of t where we let (d , ρ)  ( 12 , 12 )
where black (white) disks indicate stable (unstable) equilibria, and only those with m1 ≥ m2 ≥
m3 are drawn for simplicity. Qualitative properties are consistent with the two-cell example.
When t is large, m¯ at the center of simplex is the onlymaximizer and hence (locally or globally)
stable. For lower values of t, there are a number of KKT points (local maximizers, local
minimizers, and saddle points), all of which are equilibria of the model. In particular, the
figure illustrates the landscape of the potential function behind Lemma 3.
Figure 6 shows schematic illustrations of the equilibrium patterns associated with the
markers in Figure 5b. The grayportion of each cell indicates themass of firms in the cell. Among
equilibrium patterns, only uniform distribution (pattern U) and monocentric agglomeration
(pattern A) can be a local maximizer, i.e., a locally stable equilibrium. Patterns C and B are
unstable corner solutions. PatternsA’, B’, andC’ are interior equilibriawhichmaybe interpreted
as the intermediate patterns that connect pattern U to A, B, and C respectively. As we show in
Lemma 3, the interior equilibrium patterns A’, B’, C’, B, and C are all unstable.
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There is a considerable increase in the (possible) number of equilibrium patterns (from 5 to
25 without symmetry considerations) is detected by merely moving from I  2 to I  3. The
majority of equilibria (18 out of 25) are, however, locally unstable and thus less important. This
illustrates the fact that stability analysis is crucial for selecting meaningful equilibria within
the FO model. To this end, focusing on the global stability of equilibria is an eﬀective remedy.
In fact, by comparing the potential values for the dispersion and agglomeration, we obtain the
following simple characterization that captures essential insights into the roles of τ or t.
Proposition 5. Suppose I  3. Then, the uniform distribution is globally stable if and only if t ≥ t∗
and agglomeration is globally stable if and only if t ≤ t∗ where t∗  14 (1 − d) with d ≡ e−
τ
3 .
6.3 The four- and eight-cell city
The pith and mallow of the FO model is that it can describe the formation of multiple urban
centers as an equilibrium outcome. The four-cell city is the minimal set-up where the duo-
centric segregated pattern can possibly emerge. Under Assumption 4, in addition to the
uniform distribution (m¯ , m¯ , m¯ , m¯), the possible stable patterns include the monocentric pattern
(0, 2m¯ , 2m¯ , 0) and the duo-centric pattern (2m¯ , 0, 2m¯ , 0). However, the latter pattern fails to be
globally stable. Indeed, from the firms’ (and households’) perspectives, there is no distinction
between monocentric and duo-centric equilibria because, in both cases, households commute
to a cell that neighbors their residential cells. The total cost in the short run takes the same value
tm¯ for both the monocentric and duo-centric patterns. Therefore, the monocentric pattern is
always superior in terms of potential value.
Proposition 6. Suppose I  4. Then, the uniform distribution is globally stable if and only if t ≥ t∗,
and the monocentric agglomeration is globally stable if and only if t ≤ t∗ where t∗ ≡ 14 (1 − d2) with
d ≡ e− τ4 . The duo-centric pattern is never globally stable.
For I  8, on the other hand, it is possibile that the length of commuting may vary across
diﬀerent spatial configurations. For this case, possible configurations include the uniform
distribution (U), the monocentric (M), duo-centric (D), and quad-centric segregated patterns
which are illustrated by the schematic diagrams on the left-hand side of Figure 7. In the figures,
the arrows on the spatial patterns indicate the short-run equilibrium commuting patterns. The
short-run equilibrium commuting costs for the patterns are respectively given by 0, 2tm¯, tm¯,
and tm¯. It implies that the quad-centric pattern cannot be a globally stable equilibrium for the
same reason that the two-centric pattern for I  4 cannot be a globally stable equilibrium.
Employing Lemma 3, one can simply enumerate all spatial configurations that can possibly
become locally stable; one only needs to list allm such that mi ∈ {0, m¯ , 2m¯} for all i ∈ I up to
symmetry. Then, comparing the potential values for the spatial configurations, one obtains the
characterization of globally stable equilibria. The following proposition exhibits the selection
results for I  8.
Proposition 7. Suppose I  8. Then, there exists τ∗ such that the following conditions are met:
(a) If τ ≤ τ∗, there exists t∗ such that (i) the uniform pattern is globally stable for t ≥ t∗ and (ii) the
monocentric pattern is globally stable for t ≤ t∗.
18
Figure 7: Globally stable equilibria (I  8).
(b) If τ > τ∗, there exists t∗∗ and t∗∗∗ with t∗∗ > t∗∗∗ such that (i) the uniform pattern is globally stable
for t ≥ t∗∗, (ii) the duo-centric pattern is globally stable for t∗∗∗ ≤ t ≤ t∗∗, and (iii) the monocentric
pattern is globally stable for t ≤ t∗∗∗.
It is far simpler to visualize Proposition 7 in the (τ, t)-space. The right-hand side of Figure 7
shows the partition of the (τ, t)-space on the basis of the global stability of equilibria. The
alphabets (U, M, D) in each region correspond to the spatial patterns on the left-hand side of
the figure. When t is large, there is no possibility of agglomeration; the uniform distribution
is globally stable. In what is similar to the two- and three-cell cases, a concentration of firms
is possible if t is suﬃciently small so that the merit of proximity overcomes firms’ costs. For
lower τ, the monocentric pattern is chosen. For higher τ, one observes a new phenomenon:
emergence of duo-centric pattern. When τ is suﬃciently high, the merit of agglomeration does
not suﬃciently spill over from one cell to another. While agglomeration is always better for
firms than a uniform distribution, the merit of agglomeration does not compensate for larger
commuting costs of households incurred by a single business center.
7 The continuous city
In this section, we turn our attention to the limiting case I → ∞ to approximate the orig-
inal, continuous-space formulation. To obtain suﬃcient insights into the properties of the
continuous-space model, we restrict our attention to symmetric spatial distribution of firms
that can be readily listed, and consider selecting the pattern that maximizes potential value.
Throughout Section 7, we suppose that Assumptions 2, 3, and 4 hold true. In particular, ρ  12 .
7.1 Continuous approximation
We approximate the geography by a continuous circle C  [−12 , 12 ) where the density of land is
unity everywhere. The spatial setup is similar to that employed by Mossay and Picard (2011)
or Blanchet et al. (2016). In our case, it is employed as an “approximation” (see Section 2).
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The spatial patterns of firms and commuting patterns of households are replaced by non-
negative and measurable density functions m : C → R+ and n : C × C → R+, respectively. The
former should be in the following set of bounded measures:
Ω ≡
{
m(x) ≥ 0
 ∫C m(x)dx  12 , m(x) ≤ 1 ∀x ∈ C
}
. (26)
Ω is a continuous analogue of ∆. The set of all possible commuting pattern n of households
for given m ∈ Ω is defined by the following:
P[m] ≡
n(x , y) ≥ 0

∫
C
n(x , y)dy  1 − m(x) ∀x ∈ C∫
C
n(x , y)dx  m(y) ∀y ∈ C
 . (27)
We also let functions A : C → R+, rˇ : C → R+, wˇ : C → R+, and rˆ : C → R+ be the continuous
analogues of the level of production externalities A(m)  (Ai(m)), the short-run land rent
rˇ  (rˇi), the short-run wage wˇ  (wˇi), and the long-run additional land rent rˆ  (rˆi). In
particular, A(x) is defined by the following:
A(x) ≡
∫
C
e−τ[x−y]m(y)dy , (28)
where [x − y]  min {|x − y |, 1 − |x − y |} is the distance between x and y along C. Last, the
functions g(m), f (m), and hˇ(m) are, respectively, replaced by the following functionals:9
g[m]  f [m] − hˇ[m], (29)
f [m]  12
∬
C×C
e−τ[x−y]m(x)m(y)dxdy , (30)
hˇ[m]  min
n∈P[m]
{
t
∬
C×C
[x − y]n(x , y)dxdy
}
. (31)
7.2 Symmetric patterns
Our aim is to obtain a classification on the (τ, t)-space that generalizes Figure 7 to provide a
meaningful outline of the global phenomena over the parameter space. To this end, we restrict
our attention to a collection of symmetric spatial distributions of firms; Noting that Lemma 3
suggests that there is no room for asymmetric patterns, in which firm density takes nontrivial
values other than 0, 12 , and 1, to become stable, we define the symmetric patterns:
Definition 5 (Symmetric patterns). The symmetric patterns E ≡ {EJ}∞J1 are defined as follows:
(a) The integrated pattern E∞: m(x)  12 for all x ∈ B∞  C.
(b) The segregated patterns EJ : m(x)  1 for all x ∈ BJ ⊂ C and m(x)  0 otherwise, where
BJ ≡ ∪Jj1 BJ, j with {BJ, j} Jj1 are intervals of length 12J evenly spread over C.
9Observe that hˇ[m] is the optimal transport cost functional from source measure m to target measure 1 − m in
the case of distance cost function (see Santambrogio, 2015, Chapter 3).
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(a) E∞ (b) E1 (c) E2 (d) E3
Figure 8: Symmetric patterns E∞, E1, E2, and E3.
Figure 9: Business district, residential districts, and an equilibrium commuting pattern.
The integrated pattern E∞ is uniform distribution in which no firm concentration is present;
the business and residential areas are all integrated (Figure 8a). It is an autarky equilibrium
in which the market interaction, as well as commuting, are closed at each point in C. Another
interpretation is that there is a continuum of business centers.
The segregated patterns EJ for finite J correspond to the formation of business centers,
where J represents the number of business centers in the pattern. Figures 8b, 8c, and 8d
illustrate E1, E2, and E3, respectively. For E2 and E3, there are multiple, disjointed business
centers that are solely occupied by firms.10
In the short-run equilibrium for the J-centric segregated pattern, the city is partitioned
into a collection of small and identical “zones” in autarky; each business center is associated
with two symmetric residential districts. Each business area BJ, j is surrounded by a couple
of residential areas R−J, j and R+J, j from which its workers are supplied. Figure 9 illustrates BJ,1
and its associated residential zones where 1 − m(x)  ∫C n(x , y)dy is the residential density
of households. The short-run equilibrium, or the lower-level problem (31), is a standard
instance of optimal transport problems (see, e.g., Santambrogio, 2015) and analytic solutions are
readily available. The short-run equilibrium commuting patterns according to the theory of
optimal transport are schematically drawn by arrows;11 there is no incentive for households
(other than those on the boundaries) to commute to diﬀerent business centers. The minimized
total commuting cost, or the short-run equilibrium commuting cost, for each zone is simply
computed as t8J2 . The analytic expressions for the short-run land rent rˇ and wages wˇ are also
10We note that one may suppose I  2J0! for any finite J0 so that every symmetric spatial distributions EJ ∈ E0 ≡
{EJ } J0J1 ⊂ E is in fact associated with a segregated spatial distribution over the finite cells.
11In fact, it is a short-run equilibrium commuting pattern because for the linear commuting cost the solution of
(31) is not unique (see Santambrogio, 2015, Chapter 3).
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available, which we relegate to Appendix A since the results are standard.12
The symmetric patterns are obviously natural candidates for long-run equilibria. In fact,
the following long-run equilibrium condition for each EJ can be derived.
Lemma 4. Suppose that A is computed for EJ where we take the origin x  0 at the middle of one of
the business centers {BJ, j} Jj1. Let A J(x)  A(x) − A∞ where A∞ ≡ 1τ
(
1 − e− τ2 ) is the uniform level
of externalities for the integrated pattern E∞. Then, EJ is a long-run spatial equilibrium if and only if
A J(0) − t2J ≥ 0.
7.3 Potential values for the symmetric patterns
We have to derive the values of potential functional g[m] for the symmetric patterns to select
the spatial density profile that maximizes potential function among the symmetric patterns E.
Let f J and hˇ J be the value of f [m] and hˇ[m] for each EJ ∈ E. A direct computation gives the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let g J be the potential value associated for EJ ∈ E.
(i) For the integrated pattern, g∞  f∞ − hˇ∞ where f∞  14τ
(
1 − e− τ2 ) and hˇ∞  0.
(ii) For the segregated patterns, g J  f J − hˇ J with the following:
f J 
(
1 +ΨJ
)
f∞ and hˇ J 
t
8J , (32)
where ΨJ ∈ (0, 1), in fact, ΨJ ≡
(
1 + 2C(dJ )log(dJ )
)
δ J with dJ ≡ e− τ2J , C(z) ≡ 1−z1+z , and δ J ≡ 1 for an
even J and δ J ≡ C(e− τ2 )−1 for an odd J.
The second term hˇ J is the (minimized) total commuting cost. Evidently and intuitively, hˇ J
decreases in the number of business centers J as the commuting distance decreases with the
diminishing of the size of each business center.
The first term f J naturally decreases in the distance decay parameter τ. Reflecting the fact
that firms prefer concentration, f J is always greater than f∞ and is (basically) decreasing in the
number of business centers J. Since J-centric pattern approximates the integrated pattern E∞
when J →∞, the potential values also coincides in the limit.
Figure 10 depicts the relative magnitude ∆ f J ≡ f J − f∞ for J  1, 2, . . . , 7.13 We observe that
∆ f J , and hence f J , basically decrease in J. In particular, one can see that f1 takes the maximal
value for all τ. Therefore, if the commuting costs of households are absent so that g J  f J , the
monocentric segregated pattern E1 always maximizes g.
We clearly observe that the potential values {g J} encapsulate the trade-oﬀ between themerit
and demerit of forming multiple business centers. The first term f J decreases in the number
of business centers, J, whereas the second one −hˇ J increases in J. Thus, neither of larger J nor
smaller J is prefered by maximization across {g J}. Instead, the ordering of g J  f J − hˇ J in J
depends on τ and t.
12See the proof of Lemma 4.
13Figure 13 in Appendix A shows the graphs of {ΨJ } and { f J }, as well as {∆ f J }, for interested readers.
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Figure 10: Graphs of ∆ f J for J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 7}.
We note that there is a nice suﬃcient condition that connects the potential values and long-
run equilibrium conditions for the symmetric patterns (For interested readers, Figure 14 in
Appendix A illustrates the suﬃciency on the (τ, t)-space).
Lemma 6. Suppose g J ≥ g∞. Then, EJ is a long-run spatial equilibrium.
7.4 Potential maximizing patterns
Given a pair of structural parameters (τ, t), one can single out the most meaningful spatial
pattern by selecting J∗  argmaxJ
{
g J
}
. Moreover, Lemma 6 ensures that the spatial pattern
selected by the procedure is in fact a long-run equilibrium, as one obviously has g J ≥ g∞ if
g J  maxJ{g J}.
We first investigate the global stability of E∞. For each J, we have g J ≤ g∞ for all t ≥ t∗J(τ)
where t∗J(τ) is the unique solution of g J  f J − hˇ J  f J − t8J  f∞  g∞ in terms of t, i.e.,
t∗J(τ) ≡ 8J∆ f J(τ). If t > t∗J(τ), then EJ can never maximize the potential g[m]. Let t∗(τ) be
defined as the following:
t∗(τ) ≡ max
J
t∗J(τ). (33)
When t ≥ t∗(τ), no segregated patterns can dominate the integrated pattern E∞. In other
words, the integrated pattern is selected if the commuting costs of households are suﬃciently
high, which is consistent with the results found in Section 6 as well as intuition.
Lemma 7. Suppose t > t∗(τ). Then, E∞ maximizes g among E.
For the global stability of the segregated patterns, unfortunately, analytical predictions are
limited bacause of the complicated functional form of f J in τ and J. It is not simple to compare
the potential values (32) between diﬀerent Js (although it might seem so at first glance). We,
therefore, look directly into the partition of the (τ, t) -space obtained by numerically comparing
the potential values {g J}.
Figure 11 is the resultant partition of the the (τ, t)-space. The gray regions are where the
segregated patterns (EJ for finite J) dominate the integrated pattern E∞, while in the white
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(a) Overview [τ ∈ (0, 200)] (b) A closer view [τ ∈ (0, 50)]
Figure 11: Potential maximizing patterns (the numbers indicate argmaxJ{g J(τ, t)}).
region the opposite (i.e., t > t∗(τ)). Each gray region corresponds to one of the J-centric
patterns, whereas the number on each region corresponds to that of business centers. On the
τ-axis, gray regions are aligned in the increasing order of J. Also observe that for larger values
of τ, there appears to be a threshold value (t ≈ 0.132) of the commuting cost parameter below
which segregated patterns emerge.
7.5 Comparative statics
There are two basic implications of Figure 11. One is the eﬀect of the commuting cost parameter
t, and the other is the eﬀect of the distance decay parameter τ. First, as t decreases from larger
extremes, one first observes the formation of multiple business centers and then a reduction of
their number.
Observation 1. Fix τ and let J∗  argmaxJ{t∗J(τ)}. Suppose that initially t > t∗(τ) and consider a
monotonic decrease in t. Then, the sequence of potential maximizing patterns in E is: E∞ → EJ∗ →
EJ∗−1 → · · · → E2 → E1.
Figure 12a illustrates the process for τ  25 , which corresponds to the vertical dashed
line in Figure 13c. In the figure, the relative potential values ∆g J ≡ g J − g∞ are drawn for
J ≤ 7. We have J∗  4 for this case. The upper envelope of the curves corresponds to the
global maximizer of the potential functional. For t > t∗(25)  t∗4(25) ≈ 0.132, we have ∆g J < 0
for all segregated patterns and E∞ maximizes the potential function. When t decreases and
cuts t∗(25), E4 emerges as the potential maximizer in E. As t decreases further, the potential
maximizer sequentially switches as E4 → E3 → E2 → E1.
Next, we consider the process of increasing τ under a fixed t.
Observation 2. Fix a suﬃciently small t. Suppose that initially τ ≈ 0 and consider amonotonic increase
in τ. Then, the sequence of potential maximizing patterns in E is: E∞ → E1 → E2 → · · · limit−−−→ E∞.
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(a) ∆g J in the t-axis (τ  25) (b) ∆g J in the τ-axis (t  0.08)
Figure 12: Relative potential values ∆g J ≡ g J − g∞ and potential maximizing patterns.
Figure 12b illustrates the process for t  0.08, which corresponds to the horizontal dashed
line in Figure 13c. In that figure, in keepingwith Figure 12a, the relative potential values∆g J are
drawn for J ≤ 7. On this line, E∞ has the maximal value of potential for small τ (τ < τ∗ ≈ 1.32)
and in the limit τ → ∞. A steady increase in τ induces a repetitive emergence of segregated
patterns with increasing J as the potential maximizer in E.
Thepotentialmaximizingpattern in the limit τ →∞ is interpreted tobe either the integrated
patternE∞ or a segregated patternwith infinite business centers. AsLemma8 indicates, thepotential
value for the latter coincides with that of E∞. The two extremes of τ should be interpreted as
having distinct natures: firms at location x ∈ C experience positive externalities from other
locations y ∈ C for small τ, whereas they never experience it when τ approaches infinity. For
small τ, E∞ is globally stable because the additional merit of agglomeration does not overcome
its demerits (i.e., larger commuting costs) of it because positive externalities are already at a
suﬃciently high level even in dispersion E∞. For τ →∞, E∞ is globally stable because there is
no merit in forming business areas since there is no spatial spillover.
Remark 2. Observe that, employing Figure 11, one can infer the partition of the (τ, t)-space
on the basis of the social optimum. By scaling the vertical axis by t 7→ 2t, Figure 2 can be read
as the classification of welfare maximizing patterns among E. To this end, note that the social
welfare functional is s[m]  2 f [m] − hˇ[m]. For our specification (Assumption 2),
g[m]  f [m] − hˇ[m]  12
(
2 f [m] − 2t hˇ[m]
t
)

1
2 s[m]|t:2t . (34)
Thus, if EJ maximizes the potential functional g[m] for the parameter pair (τ, t), it maximizes
the social welfare functional s[m] for (τ, 2t). This shows that agglomeration is inadequate in
globally stable patterns.
We also note that the symmetric spatial configurations cannot be simply Pareto-ranked
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according to the number of business centers; the Pareto ranking depends on the level of τ or
t. These findings contrasts to the results of Mossay and Picard (2011), which indicate that the
formation of a single city is socially optimal in a circular economy. This stems from the fact
that our model considers two types of mobile agents, while theirs a single type.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper introduces the potential game approach to analyze a canonical urban spatial model
for the formation ofmultiple business centers proposed by Fujita andOgawa (1982). Themodel
has beenknown for its intractability, and for the resulting lack of stability analysis of equilibrium
patterns. Imposing a circular geography, Section 6 and Section 7 show that the FOmodel in fact
engenders globally stable multi-centric patterns. For a continuous circle, selection that is based
on global stability implies the emergence of the multistage (dispersion → agglomeration →
dispersion) behavior, which is analogous to a “bell-shaped curve” of economic agglomeration
in a two-region world (Fujita and Thisse, 2013, Chapter 8). Our results not only provide a
concrete answer to the longstanding stability issue of equilibria of the FO model but also
demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the potential game approach in the context of spatial economic
models.
There remain several venue for follow-up studies. First, relaxing the simplifying assump-
tions of the original FO model would be important in providing implications for economic
policies and for a robustness check of the results in the present paper. For example, following
the original model, we supposed fixed demand for land, which should be relaxed. Toward this
goal, the potential game approach is eﬃcacious for any extensions that preserve the symmetry
of externalities. For instance, Negishi’s theorem (Negishi, 1960) of implies that any competitive
assumptions may be reduced to a maximization problem of a specific kind of welfare function,
whose optimal value in turn acts as the potential function of the associated game where the
mass of agents in each cell is taken as a variable. Also, any externality that acts in each cell does
not break the existence condition for the potential function. An example is local amenities that
reduce their quality as the mass of agents in the cell grows.
Second, for the specific formulation of FO, the optimization representation [P] (or [P0]) can
be employed to study various assumptions on the geographical distances {ℓi j} between cells
for the structure of transportation network of the city. It allows one to theoretically investigate
specific idealized but important assumptions pertaining to geographies, e.g., a line segment as
in the original FOpaper, or various stylized but interesting geographies as inMatsuyama (2017).
Although one may have to resort to numerical investigations of [P] because of asymmetries,
the analysis boils down to studying an optimization problem; it is far simpler andmore eﬃcient
than directly solving the equilibrium conditions.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let 〈x, y〉 ≡ x⊤y  ∑i∈I xi yi . With multipliers w  (wi) ∈ RI+, r  (ri) ∈
RI+, v∗, and pi∗, define the Lagrangian L for the problem [P0] by
L  − f (m) + h(n) + 〈r,−a +m + (I ⊗ 1⊤I ) n〉 + 〈w, φm − (1⊤I ⊗ I ) n〉
+ 〈v∗ , 1I2 · n − N〉 + 〈pi∗ , 1I ·m −M〉 ,
where I is I-dimensional identity matrix and 1K denotes K-dimensional all-one vector. The
first-order optimality conditionwith respect to the Lagrangian L coincideswith the equilibrium
conditions listed in Definition 1. □
Proof of Lemma 1. The convexity of f (m) on ∆ follows from the facts that D  [di j] is non-
negative, symmetric and positive definite on the tangent space ∆ (Assumption 1) and that
f (m)  12m⊤Dm. See Theorem 4.4.6 of Bapat and Raghavan (1997). □
Proof for Proposition 2. Define the Lagrangian L for the problem [S] by
L  h(n) + 〈rˇ,−a +m + (I ⊗ 1⊤I ) n〉 + 〈wˇ, φm − (1⊤I ⊗ I ) n〉 .
Then, the first-order optimality condition with respect to L coincides with the short-run equi-
librium conditions listed in Definition 2. The Lagrangian dual problem [D] is obtained by
taking infn≥0 L. □
Proof for Proposition 3. Define the Lagrangian L for the problem [P] by
L  − f (m) + hˇ(m) + 〈rˆ,−a +m〉 + 〈pi∗ , 1 ·m −M〉 .
Then, the first-order optimality condition with respect to L coincides with the long-run equi-
librium conditions listed in Definition 3. □
Proof of Lemma 2. Define O ≡ {ϵ ∈ T∆ | maxi∈I{ϵi} ≤ a − (1 + φ)m¯} ⊂ T∆. Then, for all ϵ ∈ O
we have hˇ(m¯ + ϵ)  0, so that g(m)  f (m) on O. Recall that f (m) is strictly convex inm. In
particular, the parabola is centered at m¯ because, noting that the row-sum of D is the same
value for all row under Assumption 2, f (m) is rewritten as
f (m)  12 (m − m¯)
⊤D(m − m¯) + 12m¯
⊤Dm¯  f (m − m¯) + f (m¯).
Employing the above relation, for ϵ ∈ T∆ let g˜(ϵ) ≡ g(m¯ + ϵ)  f (ϵ) + f (m¯) be the potential
function defined on T∆. It follows that ∇ g˜(0)  0 and that ∇2 g˜(ϵ)  D for all ϵ ∈ O. meaning
that ϵ  0 is a local minimizer of g˜ whence m¯ is a local minimizer of g. It implies that m¯ is an
unstable equilibrium. □
Proof of Lemma 3. (a) m¯ is a localminimizer of hˇwith hˇ(m¯)  0. Evidently, we have hˇ(m¯+ϵ) > 0
for any nonzero ϵ ∈ T∆. Noting that hˇ(m) is a piecewise aﬃne function, m¯ is an isolated local
minimizer of hˇ for any t > 0. Similarly, for any ϵ ∈ T∆, letting f˜ (ϵ) ≡ f (m)  f (m¯ + ϵ) 
f (ϵ) + f (m¯), we have ∇ f˜ (0)  0 (cf., Proof of Lemma 2 above). It follows that m¯ is a local
maximizer of g(m)  f (m) − hˇ(m) for any finite t > 0, thereby showing the claim.
(b) Suppose thatm , m¯ is an interior equilibrium. Then, by definition there exists pi and
c  (ci) such that c  Dm − pi1 ≥ 0 and g(m)  f (m) − c⊤(m − m¯), where c > 0 iﬀm  m¯.
Suppose thatm , m¯ and take z ≡ ϵ(m − m¯) ∈ T∆ \ {0} with some ϵ > 0. Then,
g(m + z)  12 (m + z)⊤D(m + z) − c⊤(m − m¯ + z)
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
1
2m
⊤Dm − c⊤(m − m¯) + z⊤D(m + z) − c⊤z
 g(m) + z⊤D(m + z) − z⊤(Dm − pi1)  g(m) + z⊤Dz > g(m),
where we note that z⊤1  0 and thus Assumption 1 (ii) implies z⊤Dz > 0 because z , 0. It
shows that any interior equilibriumm other than m¯ is a local minimizer of g on the subspace
spanned by z  m − m¯; thereforem is either a local minimizer or a saddle point of g, hence
unstable.
(c) Suppose thatm is a boundary equilibrium with at least two unbalancedmixed-use cells
j and k. Because m is an equilibrium, there exist {ci} and pi such that ci  ∑ j di jm j − pi for
all i with mi > 0. Then, following the same procedure as in (a) with z ≡ ϵ(e j − ek) ∈ T∆ with
ei being the ith standard basis, one shows thatm is a local minimizer along the extreme line
spanned by z, thereby showing the claim.
For an equilibriumwithmore than two balancedmixed-use cells, simple extension of this ap-
proach fails because the short-run commuting pattern alters for after arbitrarily small deviation
so that the cost pattern c at the equilibrium does not contain information after a deviation. □
Proof of Proposition 4. We consider m1  m ∈ ∆′  [m¯ , mˆ]. Then,
g′(m)  2(1 − d) (m − m¯) − t2ρ , g
′′
 2(1 − d) > 0 m ∈ ∆′ \ {m¯} , (35)
where we note that at the left boundary g is not diﬀerentiable. Because g is strictly convex over
∆′, there is at most two local or global maximizers. For any values of (t , d), mˇ ≡ m¯+ t4ρ(1−d) > m¯
is the solution for g′(m)  0. If mˇ ∈ ∆′, mˇ it is a KKT point for the problem minm∈∆′ g(m)
and is a local minimizer. g is decreasing for all (m¯ , mˇ]whereby m¯ is always a local maximizer.
If g′(mˆ) ≥ 0, mˆ is a local maximizer. g′(mˆ) ≥ 0 follows iﬀ 0 < ρ ≤ 12 and t ≤ 2ρ2(1 − d),
or 12 < ρ < 1 and t < 2ρ(1 − ρ)(1 − d). The set of possible global maximizers are {m¯ , mˆ}.
Comparing the potential values for the two candidates, the condition for global maximizers
are obtained. □
Proof of Proposition 5. The claim follows by simply noting that hˇ(m)  ∑3i1max{0, a−(1+φ)mi}
and that g(m∗) − g(m¯)  112 (1 − d) − t3 . □
Proof of Proposition 6. Employing Lemma 3, one can enumerate all relevant spatial patterns
such that mi ∈ {0, m¯ , a}  {0, m¯ , 2m¯} for all i ∈ I as follows: (m¯ , m¯ , m¯ , m¯), (2m¯ , 0, m¯ , m¯),
(2m¯ , 2m¯ , 0, 0), and (2m¯ , 0, 2m¯ , 0). The proposition follows by just comparing the potential
values for those spatial patterns. □
Proof of Proposition 7. Employing Lemma 3, one can enumerate all relevant spatial patterns such
that mi ∈ {0, m¯ , a}  {0, m¯ , 2m¯} for all i ∈ I (which we refrain from explicitly listing up here).
The proposition follows by just comparing the potential values for the spatial patterns. The
threshold values τ∗, t∗, t∗∗, and t∗∗∗ are given by τ∗  −8 log(d∗)with d∗ ≡ 16 (
√
13 − 1) and
t∗  18 (1 − d)(1 + d)(1 + d + d
2), t∗∗  14 (1 − d)
2(1 + d)2 , t∗∗∗  14d(1 − d)(1 + d)(1 + 2d), (36)
where we let d ≡ e− τ8 . □
Proof of Lemma 4. First, note that the short-run land rent rˇ and wage wˇ for each zone are given
by the following:
rˇ(x)  wˇ(x)  min {t (x + c J ) ,−t (x − c J )} x ∈ [−c J , c J], (37)
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where we take the middle of the business center as the origin x  0 and c J ≡ 12J is the radius of
each zone.
To provide a concrete intuition, we first consider the monocentric pattern E1. Then, with
an auxiliary function A1(x) ≡ 2τe−
τ
4
(
cosh
(
τ
4
) − cosh(τx)) , the level of externalities A : C → R+
is given by the following:
A(x) 

A∞ − A1 (x + c) ∀x ∈ R−  [−c ,−b)
A∞ + A1(x) ∀x ∈ B  [−b , b)
A∞ − A1 (x − c) ∀x ∈ R+  [b , c),
(38)
where b  14 , c 
1
2 , and A∞ 
1
τ
(
1 − e− τ2 ) is the uniform level of externality for the integrated
pattern E∞. For E1 to be a long-run equilibrium, there must exist pi∗ and rˆ such that the
following is true:
rˆ(x)  (A(x) − rˇ(x) − wˇ(x))︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
The short-run profit at x
−pi∗ ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ B (39)
and rˆ(x)  0 for all x ∈ R− ∪ R+  C \ B, which is the continuous version of (23). To ensure
continuity of long-run land rent rˇ(x)+ rˆ(x), we suppose rˆ(b)  0, and since rˆ(x)  0 for x ∈ C\B,
it is implied that pi∗  A(b) − 2rˇ(b)  A∞ − t2 . It, in turn, gives the following:
rˆ(x)  A1(x) − 2 (rˇ(x) − rˇ(b))  A1(x) − 2min {t (x + b) ,−t (x − b)} ∀x ∈ B. (40)
Because A1(x) is strictly concave over B, rˆ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ B and is equivalent to requiring
that rˆ(0)  A1(0) − t2 ≥ 0. Therefore, if rˆ(0) ≥ 0, E1 is a long-run spatial equilibrium.
To generalize, consider EJ ∈ E with a finite J. Without loss of generality, take one of the
business centers in EJ (J  1, 2, 3, . . .) and let its center be the origin (x  0). Then, the business
center is expressed as BJ,1 ≡ [−b J , b J] where b J ≡ 14J . We first note that A(x) is strictly concave
on BJ,1. A direct computation gives
A(x)  A∞ + BJ + C J cosh(τx) ∀x ∈ BJ,1 , (41)
where BJ and C J are τ and J-dependent constants. Obviously, A(x) is strictly concave (and
even). We also compute that A(b)  A(−b)  A∞. Let A J(x) ≡ A(x) − A∞  BJ + C J cosh(τx).
Then, A J(b)  A J(−b)  0 and A J(x) attains its maximum at x  0.
Consider BJ,1 and its associated residential districts which is given by Z ≡ [−c , c] where
c ≡ 12J . The short-run land rent and wage is given by
rˇ(x)  wˇ(x)  min{t(x + c),−t(x − c)} ∀x ∈ Z. (42)
For EJ to be an equilibrium, we must have
rˆ(x)  (A(x) − rˇ(x) − wˇ(x)) − pi∗ ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Z (43)
with the continuity requirement rˆ(b)  0 where we omit the subscript of b J for simplicity. It
implies rˆ(b)  A(b) − 2rˇ(b) − pi∗  0 and thus pi∗  A∞ − 2rˇ(b). Then, we can rewrite (43):
rˆ(x)  A J(x) − 2 (rˇ(x) − rˇ(b))  A J(x) − 2min{t(x + b),−t(x − b)}. (44)
Because A J(x) is strictly concave and even, the requirement rˆ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ BJ,1 is satisfied
if and only if rˆ(0) ≥ 0. It implies the assertion. □
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Proof of Lemma 5. The values of the potential under Assumption 4 is computed as follows.
(i) The integrated pattern: m(x)  ρ for all C ≡ [− 12 , 12 ) . n(x , x)  1 − ρ and n(x , y)  0 for all
x , y. It follows that hˇ[m]  0 and that
g∞  f∞ 
1
2
∬
C×C
D(x , y)ρ2dxdy  ρ
2
2
∫ 1
2
− 12
e−τ |y |dy 
ρ2
τ
(
1 − e− τ2
)
. (45)
(ii) The segregated patterns (J  1, 2, . . .): given J,
f J 
1
2
∬
C×C
D(x , y)m(x)m(y)dxdy  12
J∑
i1
J∑
j1
∬
Bi×B j
D(x , y)dxdy (46)

J
2
J∑
j1
∬
B1×B j
D(x , y)dxdy (By symmetry) (47)

J
2
(
ψ0 + 2
∑ Jˆ
j1ψk + ψ J/2
)
( Jˆ ≡ ⌈ J−12 ⌉; ψ J/2 exists only for J even) (48)
where ψk ≡
∬
B1×Bk+1 D(x , y)dxdy ( j  0, 1, . . . , ⌊
J
2⌋). Let b J  ρ2J be the radius of each business
district. Define ωJ ≡ P(τb J) and ωˆJ ≡ P(2τb J)with P(z) ≡ ez − e−z Then, {ψk} is given by
ψk 

τ−2ω2J − τ−2
(
ωˆJ − 4τb J
)
for k  0
τ−2ω2Je
−τ kJ for 1 ≤ k ≤ Jˆ
τ−2ω2Je
− τ2 + τ−2
(
ωˆJ − 4τb J ) e− τ2 for J even and k  J2 . (49)
Employing these formula noting that b J 
ρ
2J 
1
4J , one obtains the formulae for f J .
For hˇ J , note that the short-run equilibrium commuting cost is tb J for every household in
the residential districts associated to each business center.
The first term f J naturally decreases in the distance decay parameter τ. Reflecting the fact
that firms prefer concentration, f J is always greater than f∞ and is (basically) decreasing in the
number of business centers J. Since J-centric pattern approximates the integrated pattern E∞
when J →∞, the potential values also coincides in the limit. The following lemma summarizes
the properties of { f J} that basically stem from those of {ΨJ}.
Lemma 8. { f J}∞J1 satisfies the following properties:
(a) f J is monotonically decreasing in τ for all J,
(b) f J > f∞ for all J,
(c) f J > f J+2 for all J,
(d) f1 > f2,
(e) limJ→∞ f J  f∞, and
(f) limτ→0 f J  limτ→0 f∞  18 .
Proof of Lemma 8. Studying the analytic formulas for { f J} one obtain the properties listed in the
lemma. For simplicity, we show proofs for even J. (a) follows by straightforward computation.
(b) follows by simply noting thatΨJ > 0. Next, for any J, we have
f J − f J+2  (ΨJ −ΨJ+2) f∞ 
(
2C(dJ)
log(dJ) −
2C(dJ+2)
log(dJ+2)
)
δ J . (50)
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(a)ΨJ (b) f J (log vertical axis) (c) ∆ f J ≡ f J − f∞  ΨJ f∞
Figure 13: Graphs ofΨJ , f J , and ∆ f J for J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 7}.
Noting that 2C(d)log(d) is decreasing in d and dJ is increasing in J, we see that the RHS is positive,
thereby showing the property (c). Next, with d ≡ e− τ4 ∈ (0, 1), we have
f1 − f2  (Ψ1 −Ψ2) f∞  − 1(1 − d2) log(d)
((1 − d)(3 − d) − 2d2 log(d)) > 0, (51)
thereby showing the property (d). (e) and (f) follows immediately. Employing the analytic
expression forΨJ , one also shows that there is always a value of τ such that f J is decreasing in
J for all J ≤ J¯ with some J¯. □
Figure 13 depictsΨJ , f J , and the relativemagnitude∆ f J ≡ f J− f∞  ΨJ f∞ for J  1, 2, . . . , 7.
We note that limτ→0ΨJ  0, limτ→∞ΨJ  1, and limJ→∞ΨJ  0. We observe that ΨJ , and
hence f J and ∆ f J , basically decrease in J. □
Proof of Lemma 6. Observe that, with the same notations as Proof of Lemma 4, we have
g J − g∞  12
∫
m(x)A(x)dx − t8J −
1
4A∞ 
J
2
∫ b
−b
(
A(x) − t2J − A∞
)
dx

J
2
∫ b
−b
(
A J(x) − t2J
)
dx ,
where we note that
∫ b
−b dx 
1
2J since b 
1
4J . Because A J(x) is strictly concave and even on
[−b , b], g J − g∞ ≥ 0 implies that the integrand in the last expression is positive for some convex
interval (−ϵ, ϵ) where 0 < ϵ < b. Therefore, g J − g∞ ≥ 0 is suﬃcient for A J(0) − t2J > 0 because
0 ∈ (−ϵ, ϵ). The condition coincides the equilibrium condition for the symmetric pattern EJ .
Thus, g J ≥ g∞ is suﬃcient for EJ to be a long-run equilibrium.
Figure 14 depicts the equilibrium condition rˆ(0) ≥ 0 and the suﬃcient condition g J ≥ g∞
for E1, E2, and E3. Each symmetric pattern is a long-run equilibrium below the dashed curve
which indicates the pairs of (τ, t) where rˆ(0)  0. The condition g J ≥ g∞ is satisfied below the
dot-dashed curves that indicate g J  g∞. Observe that the latter is contained by the former,
which illustrates the suﬃciency. The gray regions indicate where g J  maxJ{g J} holds true for
each J, which are extracts from Figure 11. □
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Figure 14: Illustration of Lemma 6.
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